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ABSTRACT
Multi-issue, multi-party conflicts in the public sector can be
resolved by supplementing traditional dispute resolution processes with
mediated negotiation. Mediated negotiation involves face-to-face dialogue
among disputants with the help of a nonpartisan facilitator. It enables
disputants to identify or invent areas of overlapping interest that can
serve as the basis for voluntary, mutually accepted settlement.
Bargaining power is a person's ability to reach a negotiated settlement
that satisfies both his and his adversary's interests.
This analysis examines how negotiators and mediators deal with
extreme power imbalance. Three obstacles to negotiation in situations of
extreme power imbalance are: the perception of weaker parties that
negotiation would be futile; the perception of stronger parties that
their power is absolute; and a maldistribution of critical resources such
as information, technical expertise, and negotiating skills.
Although practitioners have a wide range of ideas about how
negotiators and mediators should approach situations where power is
extremely unbalanced, conclusions can be developed regarding ways to
foster negotiation while protecting the interests of disputants:
disputants can use a mediator to help them evaluate the costs and
benefits of negotiation relative to nonsettlement; mediators can help
parties gain access to technical resources for analysis, training in
negotiation, critical information, and funds for expenses; and mediators
can help diffused parties to combine their resources into efficient
coalitions for negotiating.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Lawrence Susskind
Professor of Urban Studies and Planning
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Introduction
Disputants in public policy conflicts have three broad choices for
addressing their differences. They can avoid the dispute, contend against
one another (typically in courts, administrative agencies and
legislatures), or negotiate. Negotiation is an exchange of information
for the purpose of reaching a voluntary settlement.
Disputants move into and out of these three responses to conflict;
they are not really as distinct as they appear. Nevertheless, distinct
advantages of negotiation have led recently to numerous mediated
negotiations (negotiations with the assistance of a neutral facilitator)
over public policy disputes.
Negotiation enables disputants to solve problems without turning
control over to outside parties (Susskind, Bacow and Wheeler, 1983). If
negotiation is entered into voluntarily and settlement is adopted without
coercion, then the opportunities for satisfaction with the outcome can be
enhanced (Susskind and Ozawa 1983:260; Talbot 1983:95; Susskind and
McCreary 1985:368; Wondolleck 1985:348-352; Susskind, Bacow and Wheeler
1983:56-85, 151). If all parties that will be affected by a settlement
are represented in a negotiation, the outcome can provide a better
balancing of the parties' interests than decisions made without all
affected parties (Wondolleck 1985:349-350, 352; Susskind, Bacow and
Wheeler 1983:151, 205, 260). If unforeseen changes occur or other
compliance difficulties arise, a principled negotiation process (Fisher
1981; Patton 1983) -- which leaves relationships among disputants intact
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or improved -- offers a more ready vehicle for correction than judicial
or administrative enforcement (Susskind and McCreary 1985:366, 371, 372;
Susskind, Bacow and Wheeler 1983:204, 259-260). Finally, negotiation
enables disputants to resolve their differences in creative ways
(Susskind and McCreary 1985:366, 369, 370; Wondolleck 1985:352). Parties
may do better than simply splitting their differences; they might
discover ways to increase or maximize their joint gains (Raiffa 1982;
Susskind, Bacow and Wheeler 1983:24, 75-76; Buckle and Thomas-Buckle
1986).
Extreme imbalances of power pose a special challenge to negotiators
and mediators. In situations where power is extremely unbalanced, the
stronger party considers its gains outside of negotiation to dwarf gains
it could achieve by negotiating. The benefits of negotiation are
considered meaningless by the much more powerful party compared to its
substantial unilateral winnings. Similarly, the losses that a much weaker
party incurs against its opponent are great; any gains (reductions in
loss) available through negotiation with a much stronger party are
considered inconsequential by comparison.
In this thesis I describe how disputants can deal with extreme power
imbalances. I show what disputants themselves could do, and how mediators
could help. Information on how some negotiators and mediators think about
the sources of bargaining power and ways to deal with extreme power
imbalances were used in developing recommendations for practitioners
facing extreme imbalances.
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Selection of and access to the practitioners followed from research
directed by Prof. Michael Wheeler of the Program on Negotiation, Harvard
Law School. That research selected environmental dispute resolution
practitioners for a series of "debriefing" interviews (Wheeler 1985).
Separate interviews for this thesis made use of the working relationship
that was established with those practitioners.
Negotiators and mediators can change the distribution of power when
extreme power imbalances block successful negotiation. The underlying
purpose of changing the distribution of power is to change disputants'
assessments of the potential value of contention and avoidance relative
to negotiation. In general, negotiators and mediators can empower both
sides in an extremely imbalanced power relationship by increasing the
perceived value of negotiation and/or decreasing the perceived value of
its alternatives.
The recommendations made in the final chapter follow from a
discussion of the nature of bargaining power (chapter one) and the unique
circumstances of extreme power imbalance and the problems it engenders
(chapter two). In chapter three, summaries and analyses are presented of
practitioner interviews.
We focus primarily (although not exclusively) on the ideas of
environmental dispute resolution practitioners. However, the processes
that practitioners use in resolving environmental disputes have developed
from and have influenced dispute resolution in diverse fields. It is
becoming increasingly difficult to define certain disputes as
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"environmental" and others as "labor," "international," "community,"
"criminal," "organizational," "interpersonal" or otherwise. Although the
thesis is confined for the most part to environmental dispute resolution
practitioners and cases, it has also been possible to draw from more
generalized theories of dispute resolution. If the analysis and
recommendations have any applicability at all, it may be to all disputes
in which power is extremely unbalanced.
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CHAPTER ONE: BARGAINING POWER
Most people have an intuitive idea about the sources of bargaining
power. Difficulty arises, however, when we try to define or describe the
ways in which bargaining power is accumulated and applied. This
difficulty stems partially from the fact that bargaining power is
constantly changing as a result of what disputants do as well as events
beyond their control. Our objective in this chapter is to develop a
picture of bargaining power for negotiators in multi-party, multi-issue
conflicts.
There are various perspectives on bargaining power. For example, one
view is that power flows into the hands of the negotiator who can "create
doubts" (Colosi 1983). Another view is that bargaining power stems from
resources that parties possess whether or not they negotiate. These
resources include money, consultants, authority, experience, and access
to technical and legal expertise. Commitments to follow through on
threats are frequently thought to give a party bargaining power
(Schelling 1980). Finally, a fourth view is that power in negotiation
belongs to those who can integrate their negotiating partner's interests
with their own (Fisher 1983).
A description follows of some sources of bargaining power. It is
followed by a consideration of how power can be distributed in
negotiation, the problems that can arise when power is extremely
unbalanced, and the things that negotiators and mediators do to correct
those problems.
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SOURCES OF NEGOTIATING POWER
Resources that are Independent of Bargaining
It seems as though all sorts of resources can be used to influence
the outcome of a negotiation. A party can use experts or its own analyses
to convince others of certain facts and therefore certain conclusions.
Knowledge and experience accumulated away from the bargaining table can
influence negotiators at the table. Money can be used to purchase other
resources, or it can be used directly as an incentive for settlement.
Sam Gusman (1984) describes a negotiation (between the National
Agricultural Chemical Association and a coalition of church and
environmental organizations) over reduction of pesticide misuse in Third
World countries. According to Gusman, negotiators with first hand
knowledge about developing countries exercised bargaining power over
those without the knowledge.
First hand knowledge, based on experience, is a source of bargaining
power that parties acquire separately from what happens at the
negotiating table. People without this knowledge had greater uncertainty
about whether their assumptions and proposals made sense. The knowledge
of what was actually occurring inside the countries, and therefore of
what might work, was often decisive in coming to some conclusion (Gusman
1984).
In a water pollution control case at the Holston River, EPA Region IV
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and the Tennessee Eastman Company were able to negotiate an agreement
about the conditions of a water pollution discharge permit (Susskind,
Bacow and Wheeler 1983). The company and EPA viewed their differences as
primarily technical and sought to resolve them out of the public eye. The
company, in particular, wanted to avoid publicity until questions over
EPA's technical approach were resolved by company and agency specialists.
The negotiating power of both parties stemmed in large part from
resources that had been developed independently of the bargaining. The
company was able to exert power through its technical expertise
(consultants and internal scientific staff). EPA's negotiating power
stemmed in part from its statuatory authority, particularly its mandate
to notify the public of its intent to issue a permit for the company.
In another case, Montana Power Company and the Northern Cheyenne
Indians generated an agreement which stipulated that the Northern
Cheyenne would drop legal challenges to the company's proposed Colstrip
power plant. In exchange, Montana Power agreed to provide the Northern
Cheyenne with hundreds of thousands of dollars worth of job training
scholarships, bus service, air quality monitoring funds, capital for the
tribal bank, funds for a community relations project, law enforcement
funds, and planning funds (Susskind, Bacow and Wheeler 1983).
Montana Power Company's financial resources played a significant role
in the Colstrip settlement. Resources that it possessed separate from the
negotiation enabled it to control the terms of settlement by underwriting
the cost of social, cultural, economic and environmental programs for the
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Northern Cheyenne.
The sources of power illustrated above could have been used in other
ways than for negotiation. For example, Montana Power could have used its
financial resources to underwrite litigation or lobbyists, rather than
incentives for the Northern Cheyenne. Tennessee Eastman's technical
expertise could have been used to convince a judge instead of its
opponent, EPA. In the same case, EPA's authority could have been
exercised only through the formal permit process, but it chose to
negotiate as well. The knowledge used by negotiators in the Third World
pesticide case could have been used in a public relations campaign.
Creating Doubts
Colosi (1983) suggests that when opposition to settlement is strong,
a negotiator may be able to exert power towards settlement by making his
opponents uncertain about their resistance. If a negotiator can identify
which assumptions, problem definitions, positions or proposed solutions
are blocking settlement, he can move negotiations toward settlement by
raising doubts in his opponents' minds over those ideas.
Colosi offers an example of a community coalition which opposes the
establishment of a home for the mentally retarded in its neighborhood on
the grounds that such a home would make the neighborhood less safe. He
says that an advocate of the home might exercise negotiating power by
raising doubts in the community negotiator's mind over the extent to
which community safety is endangered by the home. The advocate could
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suggest that additional numbers of sincere, capable adults would
contribute to community safety, rather than undermine it. The advocate
could ask the community to look at the abilities of the retarded adults
as well as their problems.
The advocate for the home is trying to make the community uncertain
only about its opposition. He is not trying to make the community
uncertain about the abilities of mentally retarded adults or about
community safety. In fact, his negotiating power depends as much upon his
ability to establish new convictions in the other negotiator's mind as it
does on his ability to raise doubts.
Perhaps this is actually how one "creates doubts." A negotiator has
to listen to his opponent's arguments in order to understand how those
arguments block settlement. He has to identify which of his opponent's
assumptions, problem definitions, positions or proposed solutions are
blocking settlement and are susceptible to doubt. He has to do something
to create that doubt -- provide counter examples, cite experts, introduce
and interpret new data, simulate alternative futures -- and then he has
to establish new convictions in his opponent's mind which will lead to a
settlement.
Negotiating power depends upon much more than doubt (i.e.,
uncertainty and disbelief). The way to establish new conviction in an
opponent's mind is to show how settlement will satisfy his interests.
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Commitment
A negotiator conveys his own strong intentions, and can influence the
range of options from which his partners have to choose, by making
commitments. (Fisher 1983; Schelling 1980).
In a case described by Robert Golten (1984), parties in a dispute
over use of land in Wyoming made commitments to carry out threats in
order to influence settlement. The dispute involved land that is critical
habitat for antelope and a valuable coal reserve. Four parties --
environmentalists (represented by National Wildlife Federation), a
rancher who owns the surface rights, a coal company that owns the
underground coal and a federal agency -- were negotiating uses for the
land.
Prior to the negotiation, the rancher erected a fence that prevented
antelope from gaining access to the habitat. Several antelope died. The
rancher later removed the fence, but because he demonstrated that he
would go to such lengths, Golten said, the environmentalists tried to be
"especially reasonable" in the negotiation.
National Wildlife Federation filed suit to designate the land
unsuitable for coal development. If successful, this would have placed
about fifty million tons of coal out of the rancher's and coal company's
reach. Golten explained that the environmentalists' ability to maintain
this kind of legal pressure on the coal company and rancher contributed
to those parties' willingness to negotiate.
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The rancher's fence and the environmentalists' lawsuit are examples
of commitments to carry out threats in the event that a mutually
satisfactory settlement was not reached. The threats were, respectively,
to kill antelope and to tie up coal reserves.
Commitments are "trip wires" set up by disputants to warn the other
side that the fulfillment of a threat is near (Schelling 1980). The
environmentalists and the rancher did not want to carry out their
threats. The threats would not have satisfied either party's interests.
Their commitments (the fence and law suit) demonstrated, however, that
they might go through with killing antelope or eliminating coal
development. If believed, commitments to carry out a threat can engender
negotiating power by leading the other side to reevaluate (raise) its
estimates of the costs of not settling.
A positive commitment (Fisher 1983) was made by the manager of a
large sewage treatment district, the Washington, D.C. Suburban Sanitary
District, during a negotiation over the state of Maryland's Nutrient
Control Strategy for the Patuxent River. The manager, representing
upstream counties, promised to institute a program of land treatment (an
alternative desired by downstream counties to traditional sewage
treatment facilities) if the other parties allocated to his district a
certain share of riverwide nutrient loadings allowance (Schneider and
Sachs 1983).
Promises and threats must be understood and believed by disputants if
they are to work. The rancher believed that the environmentalists would
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freeze coal reserves through legal action. The environmentalists believed
that the rancher would kill more antelope. The negotiators in the
Patuxent River case believed that the Washington Suburban Sanitary
District would institute a land treatment project.
Elegant Solutions
Roger Fisher (1983) suggests another kind of negotiating power, the
power of a "good solution". Fisher says that a negotiator can exercise
negotiating power by making proposals which reconcile the interests of
all the disputants.
A negotiator that proposes an elegant solution defines areas where he
and his partners share interests. For example, EPA used the power of an
elegant solution in its negotiation with the Town of Jackson, Wyoming and
Teton County over the siting of a new sewage treatment plant (Susskind,
Bacow and Wheeler 1983). EPA's primary interest was to bring Jackson's
sewage treatment system into compliance with the Clean Water Act. The
town proposed to locate a new plant in an undeveloped area of the county
on the grounds that this was an efficient way to serve future development
in the area. Teton County opposed the proposal because it believed that
the new plant would encourage intensive development in a rural,
agricultural area. EPA proposed that Jackson be allowed its remote site
and the county be allowed to restrict the annual number of out-of-town
sewer taps. By satisfying the interests of both local governments in its
proposal, EPA was able to get an agreement that it too found acceptable.
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CHAPTER TWO: POWER IMBALANCE
Unequal distributions of power do not necessarily prevent
negotiation. Negotiation among disputants whose power is unequal can
occur as long as the disputants believe that there are opportunities for
negotiation, as well as conflict, in their relationship and sufficient
resources are available around the table to support negotiation. Extreme
imbalances of power occur, and negotiation will be blocked, when these
conditions are not met. Stronger disputants in extremely unbalanced
relationships gain so much from competition, and weaker parties lose so
much, that they see little potential value in negotiation.
Even if perceptions are changed, resources in an extremely unbalanced
power relationship may be so maldistributed that negotiation cannot
occur. Disputants and mediators in situations of extreme power imbalance
need to change both the perceptions of competition relative to
negotiation and the distribution of resources in order for negotiation to
occur.
Successful negotiation is possible among disputants whose power is
unbalanced. As long as disputants can find areas where they can settle,
and consequently do better for themselves than through contention or
avoidance, their imbalance does not have to block successful negotiation.
For example, the Denver Water Board had greater negotiating power
than the environmentalists it opposed in a complex multi-issue,
multi-party mediated negotiation. Nevertheless, bargaining occurred and
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the outcome and process were successful on a number of counts. (Susskind,
1981; Susskind and Ozawa 1983; Burgess 1983; Bacow and Wheeler 1984).
In the 1970s, the Denver, Colorado Water Board (DWB) proposed to
extend the water treatment system serving metropolitan Denver. The
extension, called the Foothills Project, was a water treatment facility,
dam and reservoir on the South Platte River. Environmentalists and
several federal agencies opposed the project in administrative and
judicial proceedings. Project opponents claimed that Foothills could be
replaced by less costly water conservation measures, that it would spur
growth and exacerbate air pollution problems, that it would harm wildlife
habitats and recreational lands, and that completion of Foothills would
be a step toward completion of another controversial DWB project, the Two
Forks Dam and Reservoir. The business community and most political
leaders and officials in the region supported the project as a way to
meet future water demand.
The dispute was ultimately settled with the services of a mediator,
Congressman Tim Wirth. Under the settlement, construction of the project
was allowed at the site proposed by DWB in exchange for mitigation
measures designed to maintain stream flows and protect the environment,
payment by DWB of environmentalists' attorneys fees, a water conservation
program, a commitment to open DWB planning to public participation, a
commitment to internalize the costs of environmental mitigation in future
DWB projects, termination of lawsuits, a statement by DWB recognizing the
right of the environmentalists to have challenged Foothills, and a
commitment by federal agencies to conduct a DWB systemwide environmental
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impact assessment.
DWB had more negotiating power than the environmentalists. Its
primary interest -- construction of Foothills -- was achieved. The
environmentalists were not as effective as DWB: they could not stop
Foothills. They also did not gain as much as DWB through settlement,
since by settling they were assuring DWB that Foothills would be built.
The environmentalists gained promises of future access to DWB decision
making, mitigation of project impacts, and compensation. These were not
the environmentalists' primary interests, however.
The difference in power between the parties did not preclude a
satisfactory negotiation. The disputants were satisfied with the outcome
(Burgess 1983). Each gained more 'from negotiation than they probably
would have from litigation alone (Susskind and Ozawa 1983). The
negotiation took less time than other alternatives probably would have,
considering the probability of each side continuing the dispute until all
avenues were exhausted (Susskind and Ozawa 1983). It is also likely that
the Foothills negotiation contributed to the acceptance of negotiation by
disputants in subsequent regional water projects proposed by DWB (Burgess
1983; Kennedy and Lansford 1983).
There were some shortcomings in the Foothills process and outcomes,
but these only limit the success. They are not evidence that the
negotiation was unsuccessful. The settlement was severely criticized by
the judge presiding over the Foothills case trial (Burgess 1983). He
refused to sign a proposed Consent Decree based upon the negotiated
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settlement. This made implementation somewhat tenuous. In fact, the
environmentalists have cited seven violations of the agreement (Bacow and
Wheeler 1984). A faction of the environmental coalition later contested
the Foothills settlement in court (Susskind and Ozawa 1983). Regional
water users and ratepayers had no opportunity to participate in the
Foothills mediation at all (Susskind 1981). As a result, their interests
-- economical and adequate water supplies for the future -- were
overlooked in the settlement (Burgess 1983). On the basis of these
oversights and failures, the Foothills negotiation cannot be called an
unqualified success. Nevertheless, the parties feel better off and an
opportunity was created for continued negotiation (hopefully even more
successful negotiation) on DWB projects.
The Foothills negotiation, like others, was comprised of divergent
and convergent interests. While EPA and the environmentalists wanted to
stop Foothills, DWB wanted the project to proceed. When it became clear
that Foothills could not be stopped, the environmentalists and DWB shared
an interest in the conditions under which the Foothills project would be
built and operated. They ultimately saw more value in settlement than in
continued competition.
Successful negotiation can occur among disputants that are unbalanced
with respect to their power as long as the disputants believe that their
interests would be better served by a negotiated settlement than by its
alternatives.
When disputants believe that their power is extremely unbalanced,
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avoidance and contention will dominate the relationship. If a party
thinks that it is much weaker it will consider any gains through
settlement to be meaningless when seen against its competitive losses. If
a party thinks that it is much stronger than its opponent, it will
consider the gain that is possible through negotiation to be meaningless
in view of its great gains in competition. As a result, cooperative
opportunities in a potentially mixed-motive situation are not exploited
for the benefit of both parties.
Disputants who perceive an extremely unbalanced power relationship
lack the desire to enter negotiations. This is true for disputants who
see themselves as being very powerful as well as for those who consider
themselves very weak.
A party that considers itself to be much more powerful than other
disputants believes that it already has all that it wants. It sees no
potential for further gains through negotiations. It may fear that
negotiations would undermine its advantage, causing it to concede
unnecessarily to its weaker adversaries. For example, a negotiation
between the Montana Power Company and the Northern Cheyenne Indian Tribe
could not begin as long as each side felt much more powerful than the
other (Susskind, Bacow and Wheeler 1983). Montana Power had proposed to
construct two new 700-megawatt coal-fired electric powerplants at its
existing generating facilities at Colstrip, Montana. The new plants were
opposed by the Northern Cheyenne on the grounds that they would adversely
affect air quality on tribal lands.
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Each party thought that it was in an unbalanced power relationship,
but each considered itself strongest. Montana Power had constructed two
power plants at the site in the past, with little opposition. It
considered its proposal to add to those facilities to be even less
contentious. The Northern Cheyenne believed that it possessed the power
to stop construction through provisions of the Federal Clean Air Act.
Court and regulatory victories for each reinforced each side's
perceptions of extreme superiority and blocked negotiation.
Perceptions of extreme weakness have also led disputants to reject
negotiations. A lack of resources (money, time, and information) was one
reason offered by environmentalists for their objection to a regulatory
negotiation over low level radioactive waste standards (the other reasons
centered around the suitability of the rule for negotiation). The
environmentalists felt that without adequate resources they lacked
negotiation power. EPA dropped the rule as a candidate for regulatory
negotiation after it became clear that environmentalists would not
participate (Fish 1984).
In an interview for this presentation, Howard Bellman described a
negotiation that became deadlocked after a community realized that it
could not evaluate the technical aspects of a landfill proponent's
proposals. The community perceived an extreme imbalance between their own
and their opponent's technical abilities. They lost confidence
mid-process in their ability to negotiate. Parties in another dispute
over oil and gas leasing in the Palisades area of Wyoming and Idaho
believed that they could not continue negotiating because of an extreme
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imbalance of bargaining power. The developers were prepared and
authorized to negotiate, but the U.S. Forest Service negotiating team
lacked authority to make decisions needed to reach an agreement, lacked
expertise in the issues, and lacked internal cohesion (Wondolleck 1983).
The negotiation ended without settlement and the dispute was taken back
to the courts.
Social psychologists draw a distinction between the power of a
disputant and the disputant's competitiveness ("motivational
orientation") (Rubin and Brown 1975). This helps them in studying the
effects that different degrees of negotiating power and competitiveness
have upon the effectiveness of negotiators. It also helps them in
studying the interaction between motivational orientation and bargaining
power. They have found in experiments where motivational orientation and
bargaining power could be manipulated by researchers that parties with
greater bargaining power tend to behave exploitively against parties with
less bargaining power. Furthermore, they have found that parties with
less bargaining power tend to submit to this exploitation unless they can
withdraw from the relationship or enter into a coalition.
In situations of extreme power imbalance, the exploitative tendencies
of the stronger party are probably exacerbated. The stronger party sees
no benefit in negotiating because it believes can achieve so much outside
the process. Similarly, the weaker party believes that its great losses
will not be meaningfully reduced through negotiation. The motivation to
negotiate is eliminated, or blocked, in extremely unbalanced power
relationships.
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CHAPTER THREE: PRACTITIONER RESPONSES TO EXTREME POWER IMBALANCE
Extreme imbalance of power is a problem that practitioners in dispute
resolution face regularly. The purpose of this chapter is to introduce a
collection of ideas about extreme power imbalance being applied by
mediators and negotiators with experience in environmental dispute
resolution. Six practitioners were interviewed in order to understand how
they view and deal with two key problems:
(1) What should a disputant do if his negotiation power is much less than
his opponent's power?
(2) What should a mediator do in a dispute where the distribution of
power among the parties is extremely unbalanced?
Summaries of the information gathered in the interviews are presented
in this chapter. The summaries are based on transcripts edited by the
interviewees. They have been further edited to include only information
on how negotiators and mediators deal with extreme power imbalance. In
order to be understandable, some ideas needed to be presented with
related assumptions about sources of bargaining power, or the objectives
of negotiation and mediation. Some interviewees illustrated their points
with detailed cases, others with anecdotes, and still others conveyed
personal theories of practice without much elaboration or evidence. My
criteria for inclusion in the summary was quite broad: a practitioner had
to say it, and I had to find it relevant to the two problems into which I
was seeking insight.
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An analysis follows each summary. After identifying salient
propositions, I describe how a suggested tactic or strategy might work,
what its limitations might be, whether alternative approaches (that are
less expensive, more effective, fairer or more durable) might exist, and
what the relationship of the idea is to others raised in the summaries.
A very helpful guide to organizing my thoughts on these ideas was
Getting To Yes (Fisher 1981), especially the chapter on BATNA. The BATNA
concept, and the idea of "changing the game," appear to encompass all the
meaningful ideas raised by the practitioners for negotiators. Suggestions
for mediators fell under either BATNA or an area not explored in Yes,
providing access to technical information.
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Robert J. Golten
Robert Golten is an attorney who represents the National Wildlife
Federation (NWF) in litigation. He works out of the Natural Resource
Clinic at the University of Colorado Law School in Boulder, Colorado.
Golten says he has been successful at developing negotiating power by
taking the initiative to develop proposed solutions, appealing to his
opponents' interests and maintaining a credible threat to litigate. He
has predicated his willingness to negotiate upon receipt of technical
assistance from his opponents. He thinks mediators have a responsibility
to help weaker negotiators by encouraging stronger parties to not be
exploitive and by ensuring that weaker parties receive any technical
resources that they are promised.
Golten used his experience as the NWF's negotiator on the
Metropolitan Denver Water Roundtable (Kennedy and Lansford 1983) to
illustrate negotiating power and the role of the mediator when power is
extremely unbalanced. According to Golten, as long as the environ-
mentalists were not negotiating, they had much less power than the
development interest they opposed. While the environmentalists were not
negotiating, the Denver Water Board (DWB) was ignoring the interests of
the environmentalists. However, said Golten, the power shifted once the
negotiation began. Only through negotiation was NWF able to get DWB to
consider modifications to its development project.
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For example, the environmentalists were challenged during negotiation
to produce a technical proposal for meeting Denver's water needs.
Although the environmentalists wanted no dams at all, they felt that the
development interests could not dissuaded from building dams. NWF
developed a solution that included other dams, but not the dam the
environmentalists objected to more: Two Forks. Said Golten, "we had to
understand what their needs were and we had to play to them, but we did
so with a lot of intelligence and energy."
Golten explained what he thinks a mediator should do if one party
appears to be much less powerful. There are situations, he said, where
one side does not have the skill, the energy or the ability to "stay up"
in a negotiation. The mediator has to "prop up the negotiator a little in
that case." He suggested that the mediator talk and reason with the more
powerful side to make sure the side strikes a reasonable pose and and a
reasonable bargain. If the more powerful party over-reaches, said Golten,
then the parties together are going to have a very fragile agreement. As
soon as the powerless party gets some power, or gets angry, then the
agreement is going to fall apart, he said.
NWF is participating in the Corps of Engineers' systemwide EIS review
of the Denver Water Board's future plans. NWF agreed to stay in this
process -- and to stay out of court -- in return for $65,000 for
technical assistance. After a year, said Golten, the money had not been
provided although it was desperately needed. NWF's technical expert had
been using money borrowed from the personal resources of allies at the
table. The mediator was responsible for ensuring that the process did not
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fall apart, said Golten, but he "would not or could not" get NWF the
money that NWF was promised. Nevertheless, NWF continued to negotiate in
order to protect its interests in Denver Water Board planning.
Analysis of Golten
Four propositions about dealing with extreme power imbalance are
relevant to the foregoing summary. First, negotiation provides power to
an extremely weaker party by making opponents aware of the party's
interests. Second, weaker disputants can build power by predicating their
involvement in a negotiation upon receipt of technical assistance. Third,
mediators must enforce agreements among parties in which technical
assistance is promised. Fourth, mediators can protect extremely weaker
parties by reminding stronger parties that exploitation and coercion will
produce a fragile agreement.
National Wildlife Federation (NWF) felt ignored by the Denver Water
Board (DWB) prior to the Water Roundtable. Once in negotiation, however,
NWF felt much more powerful. Was it the negotiation process that
empowered NWF? How did it get into the Roundtable in the first place?
The power that litigation gave NWF should not be discounted.
Litigation enabled NWF to raise the cost to DWB of ignoring environmental
interests. Litigation made the parties interdependent. Litigation stopped
DWB from ignoring NWF's demands.
The Roundtable is a method by which DWB, NWF and others can do
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something about their interdependence. It complements the power (the
attention or recognition) that NWF derives from litigation. Once in the
process, NWF discovered that it needed still greater resources in order
to participate effectively. Since it is too costly (in terms of
litigation and delayed water projects) for DWB to ignore NWF, NWF was
able to obtain a promise from the Roundtable (primarily DWB) to provide
NWF with technical assistance.
This could have provided further power to NWF, but the promise was
not kept. The mediator responsible for the Roundtable negotiations was
probably faced with a dilemma: Should the mediator advocate for NWF's
technical assistance (and potentially alienate NWF's opponents who, for
some reason, have not upheld their commitment), or should he continue to
manage the process without the technical assistance (until NWF shows
greater need for it)?
One response is that mediators should not introduce new resources
into a negotiation unless there is a definite need. Mediators needlessly
alter the negotiating dynamics, some people might say, by infusing
resources when there is no obvious threat to the process. Mediators
provide resources (assistance) as'a correction. Another response is that
mediators can prevent probleins from occurring in a complex negotiation.
Mediators can enhance negotiation by using their professional judgment in
deciding when and how to intervene in a dispute.
The Roundtable mediator apparently operated under the first view,
that his role is corrective rather than preventive. Howard Bellman's
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approach in a landfill case (described below) was similarly corrective
(one party was already unable to negotiate for lack of technical
resources). The Roundtable mediator, and the other Roundtable
negotiators, apparently believed that whatever mutual interests the
parties shared in the process, it was not jeopardized by NWF's lack of
supplemental technical assistance. Neither was it immediately jeopardized
by NWF's resentment or disappointment in not getting what it was
promised. Perhaps these feelings will surface later.
Even if mediators have no obligation to provide technical resources
to parties who claim to need them, they have an obligation to enforce
process groundrules. Groundrules are an important protection to all
disputants, especially the less powerful. Mediators can change obstinate,
exploitative negotiations into "new games" with new, principled rules. By
not providing the technical assistance, as agreed, or not explaining why
the assistance was not forthcoming, the Roundtable mediator was not
fulfilling his function as introducer and enforcer of process rules.
Finally, a mediator can protect a much less powerful party by
reminding its opponent that exploitative or coercive agreements are
fragile. Mediators can suggest that power will change, over time or even
in response to new motivations. If weaker parties become angered by an
excessively unfair settlement, a mediator can suggest, they will find a
way to retaliate. The purpose of this message is to change the
expectations of stronger parties in order to foster negotiation and,
hopefully, a more durable settlement.
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Jeffrey G. Miller
Jeffrey Miller is former U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Acting
Assistant Administrator for Enforcement. Since 1981 he has been a partner
in the Washington, DC law firm of Bergson, Borkland, Margolis, and Adler.
Miller described extreme power imbalance in the context of
environmental enforcement cases. He describes a case in which a citizens'
group overcame an extreme imbalance of power by affirming in court its
right to bring a "citizen enforcement action" against a polluter. In rare
circumstances, he said, companies have overcome extreme imbalance by
soliciting help from members of Congress (who have authority over
enforcement agencies) or state officials (who are the peers of federal
enforcers and also have credible technical expertise). He does not have
enough experience with mediators to provide information on how they
respond to extreme power imbalance.
Miller said that in enforcement cases, the bargaining power of the
government derives from its ability to impose sanctions upon violators.
The government may also derive power by using the media to inform the
public about health and environmental dangers posed by a violator.
The usual countervailing power on the corporate side, he said, is the
power of information: companies usually have more specific information
about their own compliance problems than the government. Companies often
try to convince the government that enforcement is unreasonable, given
what they know about the compliance problem. A company can also use the
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media to publicize layoffs and place blame on government enforcement
actions.
Miller said that in most enforcement situations, the government's
power to impose sanctions is greater than the company's power to resist.
Government can force a party to change its general behavior, but no
private party can do that to the government. Private parties can only try
to defend themselves. The only questions that are open to companies are
how much, how long and to what extent government sanctions will apply.
However, he said, a company might be able to obtain negotiating power
by asking people with authority over a regulatory agency to intervene on
the company's behalf. This is unusual, he said, but it has taken several
forms. The partisan intervenor might be a Senator or Representative with
authority over the agency's budget or with authority to propose
amendments to the statute at issue. State officials responsible for
implementing EPA policy or who have expertise to contradict EPA's
arguments have also been used by companies (as witnesses in court or
administrative proceedings or in formal and informal communications with
the agency) to gain power in a negotiation. Miller gave no examples.
Generally, community groups gain bargaining power through the courts
or the media, Miller said. Citizens have a right to take "citizen
enforcement" actions against violators under several environmental
statutes, including the federal Clean Water Act. In one case, a transit
authority was unresponsive to the demands of a community group to control
pollution from a subway construction project. Runoff from the project was
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polluting a local stream. The transit authority did not consider the
local group a legitimate force. Its management was unaware that citizens
could bring enforcement suits, said Miller.
In order to increase its bargaining power, Miller said, the group
went to court. It acquired a temporary injunction against the subway
construction project. The judge's decision also affirmed the group's
right to bring a citizen enforcement action. It interrupted the transit
authority's construction schedule, raised the costs of the project, and
compelled the transit authority to negotiate with the community group.
Analysis of Miller
The negotiating power of the citizen group was based on its right to
bring an enforcement action, but that power was empty as long as the
transit authority was ignorant of the law.
The citizen group overcame the extreme power imbalance that was
created by the transit authority's lack of awareness. They changed the
distribution of power by getting a judge to affirm their authority.
Once the citizen group's power was affirmed. The transit authority
reassessed the benefits of negotiation relative to continued rejection of
the group's authority. The transit authority decided that the subway
project could be built faster and cheaper if it negotiated.
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The citizen group's new power was probably only useful for
negotiating. Had they used the injunction and affirmation of their
authority to, say, stop permanently the subway project, their opponents
probably would have sought additional power (perhaps a countersuit) to
protect the project. The reason the citizen group's suit was successful
is because it was used to develop sufficient power to negotiate, and not
to prevail over the interests of its opponent.
What other ways might the citizen group have developed its
negotiating power? An individual trusted by the transit authority and the
citizens might have been asked to explain the citizen group's enforcement
authority to the transit authority. Information about the citizen group's
authority might have been conveyed in other inexpensive ways, such as by
mailing an environmental law text book with the relevant pages
paper-clipped and highlighted. Recourse to the court was not the only
way, but perhaps it was the most effective.
Luckily, the only costs to the citizen group in going to court were
court-related. The transit authority apparently did not resent the
injunction sufficiently to cause it to punish or retaliate against the
citizen group with a suit of its own. Again, this is probably because the
citizen group sought to affirm its enforcement authority in order to
negotiate.
It is probably true, as Miller says, that companies involved in
extremely unbalanced power relationships with federal enforcement
officials can enter into coalitions with members of Congress or state
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officials. A coalition between an influential legislator and a company
could change EPA's choice of action if enforcement options less desirable
to the legislator-company coalition were associated with potential budget
cuts or changes in agency mandate. Similarly, a state-company coalition
could change an EPA enforcement decision if options disliked by the
coalition were made less credible or harder to implement. Either
coalition could raise the cost to EPA of unilateral action relative to
negotiation.
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Howard Bellman
Howard Bellman is Secretary of the Wisconsin Department of Industry,
Labor and Human Relations. He is a former mediator with the Institute for
Environmental Mediation, Madison, Wisconsin.
Negotiated settlements will be unequal, Bellman says, reflecting the
power parties have away from the table. Nevertheless, Bellman lists three
ways for less powerful negotiators to develop negotiating power:
improving alternatives away from the table, promising future cooperation,
and making threats. He does not think mediators should protect weak
parties, but he recounts a situation where he, as a mediator, assisted a
less powerful party in overcoming its lack of technical expertise. This
was justified, he explained, because the party's shortcomings were
hindering the negotiation.
Bellman identified economic resources, political office (i.e.,
authority), the ability to prevail in litigation, and the ability to
shape public opinion as relevant sources of power prior to negotiation in
environmental cases. Because there are many ways for parties to exercise
power outside of negotiation, Bellman said, most parties in negotiation
can extract concessions. However, some parties will be able to extract
larger concessions than others because they have superior power away from
the table.
Weaker parties can increase their power by bargaining slowly while
developing alternatives away from the table. Bellman also said that
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parties could increase their power during negotiation by linking future
cooperation to favorable outcomes and threatening animosity in reaction
to pressure to accept on unfavorable settlement.
In spite of the ways he identified that parties can increase their
power, Bellman said that the outcomes of a negotiation are proportional
to the distribution of power prior to negotiation. A mediator cannot
protect one side because the side appears to be losing more than it
deserves, he said. A mediator's job is to get parties to think
objectively about their power, to make parties aware of the fact that
their accomplishments in negotiation reflect their power away from the
table. Weaker parties in negotiation have to be helped to see the
necessity of scaling down their demands, developing priorities and coming
to grips with what might happen if they do not reach a negotiated
settlement.
Bellman said that he has helped groups to improve their knowledge of
an issue being negotiated. This increased their power, but was necessary
in order to help them overcome reluctance to negotiate. He said that
sometimes a party will not make proposals or accept concessions until it
is satisfied with its own understanding of an issue. For example, when a
neighborhood fighting a landfill could not afford a consulting engineer
and, in the absence of professional advice could not evaluate a
compromise being ,offered by their opponents, Bellman convinced the
landfill proponents to give the neighborhood several thousands dollars to
hire an engineer who would review the proponent's proposals.
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Analysis of Bellman
Bellman offers four propositions relevant to dealing with extreme
power imbalance. First, he says that weaker parties can gain power by
building up their alternatives to settlement while negotiating slowly.
This enables a weak party to stall undesirable settlement while also
postponing undesirable consequences of nonsettlement.
If a good alternative can be developed before opponents become
frustrated with the pace of negotiation, the weaker party will have
increased its power for subsequent bargaining. However, parties who
negotiate slowly in order to develop their alternatives might undervalue
the potential that negotiators have for increasing their bargaining power
at the table. They might also overestimate their ability to resist
settlement while their alternatives are inferior.
Second, weaker parties can increase their power at the bargaining
table either by promising future cooperation in return for an acceptable
settlement or by threatening animosity in return for a coerced
settlement. This builds power by changing an opponent's expectations: a
more powerful opponent learns that there will be costs to coercion and
rewards to voluntary settlement. It also enables a weak party to increase
its power at the bargaining table through negotiation, supplementing
possible efforts to develop alternatives to settlement.
Third, mediation can change the distribution of power in extremely
unbalanced power relationships. The effectiveness of mediation in dealing
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with extreme power imbalance sometimes depends upon correcting a
maldistribution of resources. If technical resources are so poorly
distributed that one side cannot evaluate its opponent's proposals, then
mediators can change the distribution of power by providing access to
technical resources.
Instead of introducing new resources, Bellman redistributed resources
in order to save the landfill negotiation. Redistribution is only
possible, however, if the parties are aware of their interdependence.
When a mutual goal (i.e., settlement) is considered important,
redistributing power becomes less threatening to the more powerful side.
A prerequisite to redistribution, then, is interdependence.
Fourth, the role of the mediator is not to redistribute power per se.
Mediators do not deal with extreme imbalances of power in order to
protect weaker parties. Weaker parties and stronger parties are helped by
mediators to reach settlement. Rather than always redistributing
resources, mediation also entails lowering parties' expectations about
what they will accomplish in negotiation.
A mediator can (and should) accept responsibility for the quality of
the agreements he plays a role in generating. Settlements reached between
parties in an extremely unbalanced power relationship do not have to
place both sides on par with one another but the interests of both sides
must each be served. This is something a mediator can foster. Tradeoffs
can be based on principled decision rules suggested by the mediator, for
example. Unrealistic expectations of either side (not just the weaker)
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can be changed by mediator coaching on principled negotiation. This
protects the weaker party, but not at the expense of the stronger. It
protects both sides in a mutually satisfactory agreement.
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Susan Carpenter and John Kennedy
Susan Carpenter was Acting Director with Accord Associates, Boulder,
Colorado. John Kennedy is Accord's Executive Director.
Carpenter and Kennedy deal with extreme power imbalances when the
imbalance obstructs negotiation. They solicit the help of outside parties
who have influence over obstructionists, such as constituents, investors,
employers and peers. They ask weaker negotiators if they are aware of the
distribution, but Carpenter and Kennedy said that they never advise
parties to develop power away from the table.
Carpenter and Kennedy find that negotiation is hindered when a party
steadfastly believes that it has much more (or much less) power than the
others. In response, they have encouraged negotiations by making explicit
each parties' ability to cause harm, articulating the uncertainty in the
diffused distribution of power, and encouraging parties to compare
negotiation with alternative processes.
Carpenter and Kennedy described situations where an extremely
unbalanced power distribution threatened to block negotiation. In one,
the Metropolitan Denver Water Roundtable, (Kennedy and Lansford 1983)
staff of the Denver Water Board would not release certain information
over which it had control. Carpenter and Kennedy believed that the Water
Board's opponents could not negotiate without the information. The
mediators went above the heads of the staff members by asking the Water
Board Commissioners to make possible the release of the information. In
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other situations, higher-ups may be the source of the obstacle, said
Carpenter and Kennedy, instructing their representatives to participate
but not to cooperate in negotiations. Carpenter and Kennedy said that
mediators can speak to influential peers of the obstructionist in order
to foster negotiation.
Using the media, a mediator can generate publicity which can
conteract obstructive uses of power, said Carpenter and Kennedy. For
example, a mine manager might play a tough role against a regulator, they
said, but publicity might inform the mine manager's investors of the
reason for the impasse. This would motivate them to speak to the manager
about negotiating more productively.
Carpenter and Kennedy explained that if one party in a negotiation is
obviously weaker in all respects, a mediator can only check to see that
the party understands its disadvantage and how it might increase its
power. They have never encouraged parties to strengthen their position
away from the bargaining table. Instead, they raise questions -- what
type of power a party has and how leverage might be increased -- and
allow the parties to provide the answers.
Analysis of Carpenter and Kennedy
Three propositions are raised in the preceding summary. First,
mediators overcome obstacles posed by extreme power imbalanced by
changing the way disputants look at their power relationship. Any
diffusion of power is emphasized to remind stronger parties that
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exploitation and coercion can have negative consequences. The potential
for negotiation to generate superior outcomes relative to alternative
processes (e.g., avoidance, contending) is raised to encourage parties to
remain in negotiation. Mediators try to change the way the parties
perceive their relationship.
Second, mediators solicit help from the constituents and employers of
negotiators who perceive themselves to be much stronger than their
opponents. This is one of the more direct, active ways of dealing with
extreme power imbalance. Parties who are asked by mediators to help in
overcoming obstacles are stakeholders. If negotiation does not produce a
successful outcome, these stakeholders would be adversely affected. The
mediators are actually expanding participation (temporarily) to deal with
an issue of wide-ranging consequences.
Negotiators might resent being overruled by their superiors. They may
blame the mediator for causing embarrassment or trouble within the
negotiating team. One way to prevent this is to inform the negotiators
before their superiors are involved. This gives the negotiators a choice.
The news media can be used to widen the audience for a negotiation.
This can change the distribution of power by making more powerful parties
unwilling to exploit their less powerful opponents in full view of the
attentive public. On the other hand, an audience might lead disputants to
grand-stand. Concessions are sometimes easier to offer in smaller,
non-public settings. Neither sunshine nor shade work all the time. A
mediator probably has to determine who the audiences each negotiator
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would be most influenced by (and in what direction) before changing the
openness of a negotiation in order to change the power relationship.
Third, and finally, mediators raise questions to weaker disputants in
order to encourage them to think about the sources of power that are
available to it. This is a consulting or a coaching role. It helps to
change disputants perceptions and expectations about negotiation relative
to its alternatives. One caveat raised in connection with this idea is
that a mediator should not actually advise a weaker disputant on
developing its alternatives to settlement or undermining its opponent's
alternatives. The warning probably stems from concern about the
neutrality of such advice. Another concern might be that such advice will
lead to contentious behavior.
It is hard for a mediator to justify specific advice to a negotiator
on, say, suing opponents. A resource can be redistributed among
disputants (see Bellman) when a specific maldistribution is hindering
collective efforts, but positive interdependence and the development of
power away from the table appear incompatible.
If there- was a way to counsel disputants on building power away from
the table without encouraging contention, perhaps mediators could give
such advice. Maybe that would take the form of specific advice about
improving one's own alternatives to settlement but only general advice
about reducing an opponent's alternatives. Advice about reducing an
opponent's alternatives should be placed in a negotiating (not a
contending) context.
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Thomas Colosi
Thomas Colosi is Vice President of National Affairs for the American
Arbitration Association in Washington, DC.
Colosi says that disputants who are extremely weak can either accept
the "lamb's share" of a settlement, enter into coalitions in order to
negotiation from greater power, or pursue their interests in litigation
or arbitration. Mediators should not change the distribution of power
among disputants, Colosi says, although they may challenge ("create
doubts" in the minds of) parties who refuse to settle. When mediators
"create doubts," says Coldsi, they should only use information provided
by the parties.
Colosi explains that before negotiation begins, disputants try to
determine who is stronger in their particular conflict. They do this
through confrontation. For example, in the labor sector, a union might
call a work stoppage to test its ability to pull its members out of
production.
When a party learns through confrontation that it is stronger than
its opponent in-some ways and weaker in others, it negotiates to convince
its opponents that its strengths are the more relevant ones in their
dispute. Each party tries to persuade the other to accept its perceptions
of the distribution of power. They do this, says Colosi, by "creating
doubts."
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Negotiators who do not have sufficient power to "create doubts" have
three options, according to Colosi. They can accept the "reality" that in
negotiation the "lamb gets the lamb's share;" they can enter into
coalitions with other weak parties in order to increase their negotiating
power; or they can use litigation or arbitration. The potential for
weaker parties to win through litigation and arbitration encourages
negotiation by making stronger parties doubtful about their strength over
the long run.
The purpose of negotiation is settlement, says Colosi. Parties are
sometimes hindered from settling by the way one or both parties perceive
their power relationship. This is not an extreme power imbalance, but a
disagreement between the parties over who has more power (and in what
areas). When parties are unable to agree what each party is capable of
doing relative to the other, a mediator is needed.
Mediators help parties in reaching settlement by "creating doubts." A
mediator advocates to one side, or both, the perceptions about power held
by the opponent. A party is challenged to suggest a way that settlement
can be reached without accommodating his opponent's perceptions. The
mediator's objective is for the parties to adopt similar perceptions, and
consequently to settle.
Colosi thinks that mediators should help disputants to "recapture"
the exchanges they would have had if the mediator's assistance was not
needed. Colosi discourages mediators from introducing elements (other
than themselves) into negotiations. In general, when mediators create
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doubt, Colosi believes they should only use arguments raised by the
disputants. Specifically, when mediators become involved with disputants
who disagree about power, Colosi says, the only valid perceptions of how
that relationship should be structured are those of the parties.
If mediators try to change a distribution of power (for example, by
introducing his own perceptions when creating doubts), Colosi says,
stronger parties will resist (they may try to assert their power against
weaker parties) and weaker parties will become unrealistic about their
limitations. Colosi warns that weaker parties might attempt risky
exercises of their empty, "mediator-inspired" power. However, he gives no
examples of when this has ever actually happened.
Analysis of Colosi
Colosi offers three propositions about dealing with extreme power
imbalance. First, much weaker parties can change the distribution of
power by forming coalitions. Second, weaker disputants can also change
the distribution of power by using (or threatening to use) litigation and
arbitration. Third, mediators can "create doubts" in a much stronger
party's mind about his ability to prevail in the long run -- but only if
the weaker party gives the mediator information to use in creating those
doubts.
Unfortunately, Colosi provides no cases to illustrate or substantiate
his opinions. However, his first two propositions are supported by common
sense and the other practitioners (Miller on coalitions in enforcement
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cases and Golten on litigation).
Coalitions enable weaker parties with common interests to combine
resources against a common opponent. Litigation gives a weaker party the
power of legal right and authority (if it wins) and the threat of
extended conflict (raising its opponent's cost of nonsettlement). Both
can give a much less powerful party the ability to capture the attention
of negligent opponents. An opponent is thus forced to reevaluate his
original estimate of the benefits and costs of negotiation, relative to
alternatives.
Colosi's third proposition is comprised of two parts, one acceptable
and one not. Mediators can change the minds of disputants who consider
themselves too powerful to negotiate productively. However, there are
good reasons why mediators should introduce whatever information they
have at their disposal.
When a mediator creates doubts, he is trying to change a disputant's
perceptions (in our discussion, about distribution of power) and
expectations for settlement. A disputant who considers himself too strong
to negotiate productively needs to be convinced that he is not
omnipotent; that negotiation might favor his interests. A disputant who
thinks of himself as too weak to negotiate can be shown unnoticed
strengths and opportunities.
Mediators should not be bound in creating doubts by the information
provided by disputants. The information may not be accurate. Mediators
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may have relevant experiences to draw from and could warn or assist less
experienced parties of possibilities that might not have occurred to
them. Mediators may be able to introduce technical resource people who
could provide information that all sides could use. A mediator's
disinterested position may give him a perspective that neither party
(emotionally involved in the dispute) can obtain.
When assisting extremely unbalanced parties to reach agreement, a
mediator who creates doubts should be fostering wise settlement. Since he
is changing a situation (from impasse or conflict into settlement), he
has responsibility for the implications of that change. To the event that
the doubts a mediator creates is based on information he knows is true
and accurate, a mediator can be confident that he is not misleading
disputants.
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CONCLUSION
Specific ways that practitioners have changed distributions of power
and contributed to successful negotiation are:
e Mediators went over the heads of negotiators (solicited help
from the employers and constituents of the negotiators) who
thought that their control of information gave them absolute
power.
* A mediator convinced a negotiator's opponent to pay for
technical assistance which the negotiator could not afford.
* Negotiators won an injunction against a polluter and affirmed
their authority to enforce federal water pollution control laws.
These examples illustrate principles that negotiators and mediators
need to know in dealing with extreme power imbalance.
* A disputant can change an extremely imbalanced distribution of
power by:
- improving his alternatives to negotiation;
- making his opponent's alternatives to negotiation less
desirable;
- using a mediator to help "change the rules of the game."
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* A mediator can foster negotiation among disputants in an
extremely unbalanced power relationship by:
- changing parties' perceptions and
negotiation relative to alternatives;
- helping parties acquire access to technical
There are other ways that practitioners can deal
unbalanced power distribution. These are suggestions
specific cases were available but which still seem
foregoing analysis. They are:
expectations of
assistance.
with an extremely
for which no
likely given the
* A weaker disputant can predicate his participation in
negotiation upon the receipt of technical assistance.
a
* Mediators can enforce agreements that promise technical (or
other) assistance to weaker negotiators.
* Weaker disputants can seek allies whose interests they share in
order to form a coalition for negotiating.
* Mediators can highlight the potential that each party has for
causing some harm to the other. They can warn stronger parties
that exploitation produces fragile agreements.
* Mediators can solicit the involvement of peers of negotiators in
order to convince negotiators to bargain in good faith. They can
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focus wider attention on the negotiations for the same reason by
inviting the media to observe the process.
* A weaker disputant can negotiate slowly while building its power
away from the table.
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